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ABSTRACT 
In the paper, we summarize the results of a project that was motivated by the expiration of the 
“High Density Rule,” which defined the slot controls employed at New York’s LaGuardia Airport 
for more than 30 years.   The scope of the project included the analysis of several administrative 
measures, congestion pricing options and slot auctions.  The research output includes a 
congestion pricing procedure and also the specification of a slot auction mechanism.  The 
research results are based in part on two strategic simulations. These were multi-day events that 
included the participation of airport operators, most notably the Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey, FAA and DOT executives, airline representatives and other members of the air 
transportation community.  The first simulation placed participants in a stressful, high congestion 
future scenario and then allowed participants to react and problem solve under various 
administrative measures and congestion pricing options.  The second simulation was a mock slot 
auction in which participants bid on LGA arrival and departure slots for fictitious airlines.   
Key Words:  congestion management, market mechanisms, slot auctions, aviation. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND2 
In much of the developed world congestion management through slot restrictions is a 
common practice. In Europe, for example, slots are allocated based on EEC and IATA rules [Slot 
Allocation, 1992]. The guiding principles of slot allocation are mainly “grandfather rights” and 
the “use-it-or-lose-it” rule. When slots become available because of added capacity, insufficient 
use, or voluntary relinquishment, they are put in a “pool” and redistributed giving priority to new 
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2 The material in this section draws heavily on Hansen and Zhang, 2005. 
entrants [Fan and Odoni, 2002]. Airlines are allowed to exchange slots, but without financial 
transfers. These policies have been used at some airports, such as London Heathrow and Paris 
Charles de Gaulle, since the early 1970s. 
The U.S. has a large domestic airline industry with more than 500 commercial airports. In 
contrast to the European situation, access of airlines to airports in the U.S. is more of a domestic 
policy issue. At virtually all U.S. airports, runway access is on a first-come-first-served basis. 
Airport access in these cases is only restricted by the availability of terminal facilities. Slot 
controls have been used at five U.S. airports. In 1968, the High Density Rule (HDR) was 
promulgated to reduce delays at Chicago O’Hare (ORD), Washington National Airport (DCA), 
and three New York airports: Kennedy (JFK), Newark (EWR), and LaGuardia (LGA).  The rule 
was terminated in the 1970s at EWR. The HDR was supposed to expire at the end of 1969 but 
was extended several times, indefinitely in 1973. At LGA, the HDR limited the hourly slots 
(landing or takeoff rights) to 68 operations per hour3 between 6:00 am and midnight. Six slots 
were reserved for general aviation, military and charter flights, leaving 62 slots per hour for 
commercial airline flights [Crowley, 2001]. Initially, slots were distributed by a scheduling 
committee, composed of representatives from different airlines. After deregulation, the 
scheduling committee process was replaced by the use-it-or-lose-it and buy-sell rules issued by 
the FAA in 1985. While in principal these rules created a market for slots, airlines proved 
reluctant to sell them, particularly to new competitors [U.S. Congress, 2000].  
In the early 1990s, the FAA granted 42 slot exemptions for air service to LGA authorized 
by the Federal Aviation Authorization Act. Unlike regular slots, these could not be sold, and were 
authorized for specific types of flights: new international flights, new entrant airlines, and 
essential air services. The exemptions and the restrictions on their use reflected compromises 
between competing forces, including those concerned that slot restrictions stifled competition, 
and airport neighbors who wished to maintain controls because of noise impacts [U.S. Congress, 
2000]. The granting of slot exemptions posed another obstacle to the slot market, as potential 
buyers conjectured that, through exemptions, they could obtain access to LGA without paying for 
slots. 
                                                 
3 An operation is either an aircraft arrival or a departure.  In general, arrivals must equal departures in 
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More recently, AIR-21 was enacted in April 2000. This four-year reauthorization bill 
required that slot controls be eliminated after January 1, 2007. It also encouraged service to 
connect the HDR airports and small hub or non-hub airports. AIR-21 granted immediate 
exemptions to the slot restrictions for flights by regional jets with less than 72 seats and providing 
nonstop service to small-hub or non-hub airports, while permitting new entrant carriers and 
limited incumbent carriers to apply for additional exemptions [U.S. Congress, 2000].  By the fall 
of 2000, over 300 exemption requests per day had been approved for LGA, with a similar number 
still pending. Delay at LGA dramatically increased. Many observers believe that after AIR-21, 
these delays had a severe impact on operations throughout the NAS [Metron Inc., 2000; Donohue, 
2002; U.S. House of Representatives, 2001]. One analysis by MITRE showed that, on one 
particular day, “some 376 flights traveling to 73 airports experienced flights delays because their 
aircraft had passed through LaGuardia at least once that day.” 
The airport operator, the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey (PANYNJ), 
considered the LGA situation to be untenable, and, on September 19, announced that it was 
imposing a moratorium on additional flights there. Following this lead, the FAA announced a 
plan to rescind the AIR-21 slot exemptions that it had already granted and to redistribute some of 
those exemptions by a lottery. The FAA described this as only a “temporary” solution that would 
terminate on September 15, 2001. The FAA capped the number of operations per hour for 
commercial flights at 75. In this way, more than 100 flights permitted under AIR-21 were 
eliminated, and the remaining exemptions allocated by a lottery on December 4, 2000. The same 
slot limits and methods for allocating slots remain in place today, but the AIR-21 mandate to 
remove slot controls at LGA by January 1, 2007 also remains. 
In a 2001 Notice of Proposed Policy Options, the FAA and the PANYNJ proposed several 
potential options for “managing capacity at LaGuardia Airport” [Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2001]. The options included congestion-based landing fees, auctioning of landing 
and take-off rights, and various administrative alternatives. The latter included one giving priority 
to larger aircraft by having successive rounds of scheduling slots in the early rounds restricted to 
larger planes. A second administrative option called for gradually reallocating slots by 
withdrawing a percentage from large slot holders and redistributing them using a lottery. Under a 
third option, slots were allocated in four “tranches” including a baseline allocation of 20 per day, 
a set of small community slots, a set of slots that would be allocated based on airlines passenger 
traffic, and a set that would be auctioned. 
2. BACKGROUND ON PROJECT 
In October of 2004 the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the U.S. 
Department of Transportation -- Office of the Secretary (DOT) contracted with NEXTOR, the 
National Center of Excellence for Aviation Operations Research, to carry out research related to 
congestion management options for LGA.  NEXTOR, an FAA center of excellence, is a 
consortium of five universities:  George Mason University (GMU), the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), the University of California, Berkeley (UCB), the University of Maryland 
(UMD) and the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (VPISU).  The specific 
organizations involved in this project were GMU, GRA, Inc, Harvard University, MIT, UCB and 
UMD.  This research was aimed at supporting decision-making relative to the expiration of the 
HDR at LGA in January of 2007.  This paper summarizes the results of that project.  We 
emphasize that the contents of this paper solely represent the work product and opinions of the 
authors and do not in any way represent any U.S. government policy or the opinions of the FAA 
or DOT.   
The goals of the project were to develop and compare administrative and market-based 
mechanisms for controlling congestion at LGA.  A specific project task was to develop a 
mechanism for auctioning airport arrival and departure slots.  The inclusion of this task did not 
reflect any bias as to the merits of such an auction, but rather the need for a practical slot auction 
mechanism for auctions to be a viable policy alternative.  An important project feature was the 
execution of two strategic simulations.  Strategic simulations are experiments in which actual 
decision makers participate in a simulated exercise.  Probably the best know examples of such 
simulations are the “war games” used to test military preparedness.  These simulations can 
provide substantial value in three areas. First, they provide a reasonably realistic projection of the 
impact of various planned procedures and tools. It is often the case that such procedures lead to 
impasses or very difficult-to-resolve issues. These uncomfortable situations actually are the 
source of the second advantage of strategic simulations: the ability to uncover the need for 
procedures, tools or rules that were completely unanticipated at the beginning of the experiments. 
This distinguishes such simulations from exclusively computer-based simulations and analyses. 
The third very important role they play is in the education of the participants and others observing 
and studying the strategic simulation. By observing and recording the unfolding of events and the 
players’ subsequent decisions, one gains a deep and intuitive understanding of the issues 
involved.  
The first simulation was held at GMU in November of 2004.  It was principally focused 
on evaluating and comparing administrative measures and congestion pricing.  There were six 
major game “players” consisting of teams from four airlines, the Federal Government and the 
PANYNJ, which operates LGA airport. Other participants included representatives of other 
airlines and airports, the Air Transport Association and various experts from academia, industry 
and government. The game projected the participants to a hypothetical setting in November of 
2007. The baseline scenario was an LGA schedule involving approximately 1400 total operations 
(arrivals and departures), a number that exceeds recommended operational levels. The airline 
teams adjusted their schedules in response to various government controls put in place. These 
controls involved Federal Government regulations, administrative restrictions and congestion-
based fees. The airline teams made a total of five schedule adjustments.  Delay and cancellations 
statistics were estimated under all scenarios. 
The second simulation was held at UMD in February of 2005.  Its goal was to test and 
evaluate a slot auction mechanism and to demonstrate to the community how such an auction 
might operate.  The participants largely coincided with the participants in the first simulation.  In 
this case, six fictitious airlines were created.  These were given simplified business plans and 
financial objectives.  Participants were assigned to airline teams, where participants from multiple 
organizations were quite often assigned to the same team.   During the simulation a mock slot 
auction was executed in which the airline teams bid on, and eventually won/purchased, sets of 
slots on which to base projected services.  The mock auction was supported by a spreadsheet 
based decision-support tool and a web-based auction mechanism (the web-based mechanism was 
a custom modification of a commercial product provided by Market Design Inc.).  The auction 
proceeded through five rounds of bidding and ended with a slot allocation among all participating 
airlines.  Teams were given private rooms in which to deliberate in order to develop their bids for 
each round. 
The research team also conducted statistical data analysis, simulations, algorithm designs 
and other tasks.  These resulted in a wide-ranging set of results and recommendations.  In this 
paper, we highlight certain key aspects of the research. 
In August of 2006, the DOT issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) addressing 
the expiration in January of 2007 of the HDR at LGA.  We will discuss the contents of this 
NPRM later in this paper.  It is important to note that, since it was felt there was not enough time 
to complete the NPRM review and issue an actual rulemaking, an interim rule was put in place 
that largely preserves the status quo (HDR) at LGA.    
3. BASIC OPTIONS AND TRADEOFFS 
In this section we frame some of the basic questions and tradeoffs related to the 
congestion management options for LGA.   
Action or no action?  One should consider the option of eliminating the current HDR rule and 
not replacing it with any new regulation.  The severe over-scheduling that occurred during the 
AIR-21 period, would seem to indicate that there is a significant risk of extreme levels of delays 
and flight cancellations when all controls are eliminated.   
Slots or no slots?  A slot is the right to land or takeoff at a particular time (and/or to schedule 
such an operation).  By defining slots, the FAA can control precisely the number of operations 
that take place and can exercise strong control over airport delays and flight cancellations.  In 
order to control congestion, the no-slot option would have to be combined with some form of 
congestion pricing.  The no-slot option has the advantage of a high level of simplicity – any 
operator can land at any time, as long as the operator pays the appropriate (congestion) fee.  
These alternatives are compared in more detail later in the paper.  
If slots are used, then should slots be owned or leased?  Under the current system, slots have 
no defined termination dates.  The question is: should future slots have well-defined lifetimes?  
The advantage of having well-defined lifetimes is that there is a formal mechanism that forces 
slot turnover, allowing, for example, the entrance of new carriers and the expansion of existing 
carriers.  
If slots are used and slots have a finite lifetime, then should an administrative measure or a 
market mechanism be used to reallocate them? Certainly, the process of defining 
administrative measures would be challenging due to the significant political pressures that likely 
would be brought to bear on this process.  Further, historical evidence suggests that even after the 
process was defined, there would be political pressure brought to make exceptions and/or change 
it.  On the other hand, if an administrative measure is put in place, it must be one that provides 
better access to LGA slots for new entrants and carriers wishing to expand and also that 
encourages the most productive use of slots.  An obvious basis for measuring “productive use” for 
purposes of administrative allocation is the size of aircraft operated.  Other aspects of “productive 
use” such as the airline customer willingness to pay are outside the reach of administrative 
measures but would be reflected in market mechanisms.  If one were to us a market mechanism, 
then the process of determining appropriate price levels and appropriate buyers would inevitably 
take on the form of a type of auction.   
If slots are used, then how should an initial slot allocation be determined?  The two most 
likely possibilities are i) to use a market mechanism or ii) to base the initial allocation on the 
current HDR allocation.  If a market mechanism were used, then as discussed above, it would 
take on the form of an auction.  If the current slot level were left in place, then the current (HDR) 
allocation could be used as the initial allocation (differences in current slot types – HDR vs. 
AIR21 – would lead to certain complications).  If the current slot level were reduced then 
presumably some sort of pro rata formula could be used to reduce, in an appropriate way, the 
incumbents’ slot holdings.  The design of such a formula does not represent a challenging 
problem but, nonetheless, should be done with careful study.   
How can gate and other airport resources be reallocated in a manner consistent with slot 
reallocations?  Any of the schemes proposed here have the potential to cause significant changes 
in carrier schedules.  When such changes occur, carriers will require appropriate corresponding 
airport resources.  It will be important for the PANYNJ to be able to respond with such resources. 
This issue is discussed later in the paper.  
4. THE CASE FOR MARKET MECHANISMS FOR CONTROLLING AIRPORT 
CONGESTION 
The starting point for any discussion of LGA congestion management options must be to 
ask whether there is any problem with the status quo, i.e. the HDR.  The HDR allows for buy-sell 
transactions.  Economic efficiency principles state that if a free market for a good exists then 
eventually that good is well-allocated, i.e. those that value a good the most are able to obtain that 
good.  Among other things, the eventual “efficient allocation” does not depend on the mechanism 
used to produce the initial allocation.  One can then argue that since HDR allows for a free buy-
sell market with many participants that the slots will be, over time, efficiently allocated and, 
hence, put to their best use.  However, historically sales of LGA slots have mainly occurred in 
situations of carrier-owner distress, e.g. as part of bankruptcy proceedings, and, in particular, new 
entrants have had extreme difficulties in buying slots from incumbents [U.S. Congress, 2000], 
[Fownes et al, 2002].  The most evident reason for the seeming failure of this market is that the 
buyers and sellers are competitors and slots are a key business asset.  Thus, even though carrier A 
values a slot more than carrier B, carrier B will be reluctant to sell the slot to carrier A since that 
slot will increase the overall competitive position of A.  With this in mind, one then might ask 
whether there is evidence that slots are not being put to their best use at LGA.  Assuming that 
slots are not being put to their best use, one might then ask whether a market-based mechanism 
might lead to better slot use.  In Section 4.1, we summarize the results of a statistical analysis that 
indicates that the average aircraft gauge (seats per flight) for LGA flight segments is smaller than 
for comparable non-LGA flight segments in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS).  Section 
4.2 contains an overview of recent research that compares LGA service levels that seek to 
maximize system efficiency with actual LGA service levels.  In Section 4.3, we provide some 
results from the first strategic simulation that indicate that congestion pricing leads to increases in 
average gauge when compared to “equivalent” administrative measures. 
 4.1  LGA Average Gauge Analysis 
Airlines can provide a given level of passenger capacity by offering more flights on 
smaller aircraft or fewer flights on larger aircraft. If slots are scarcer at LGA than at other 
airports, and if slots are being allocated efficiently, one would expect to see larger aircraft 
operated there. Of course, other factors, including stage length, segment traffic levels, and 
segment concentration, also affect average aircraft size. In order to compare aircraft size at LGA 
with other airports, one needs to control for these factors. This section presents evidence that, all 
else equal, airlines at LGA actually operate smaller aircraft than elsewhere in the US. This 
bolsters the case that the existing slot allocation scheme is inefficient. 
An important source of aircraft size variation is whether a flight segment is served by 
commuter service or regular jet service. Commuter service involves aircraft that are 60 seats or 
smaller, and is normally provided by commuter airlines through code share agreements with the 
large jet operators. We investigated whether LGA flight segments are more or less likely to be 
served by commuters, as opposed to large jet operators. For purposes of our study, we defined a 
commuter segment as one in which over 80 percent of the flights are 60 seats or less, and a large 
jet segment as one in which over 80 percent of the flights are over 60 seats. Other segments were 
excluded from this analysis.  
Figure 1 depicts our data—for November 2004—on a log-log plot of two key 
determinants on service type: traffic density and stage length. The plot shows many LGA 
commuter segments (the blue squares) are in regions (in terms of density and stage length) where 
most of the services at other airports are large jet (the pink squares).  Statistical modeling, based 
on a binary probit model, confirms this. In the model, we included length and density (in log 
form), and a dummy variable for LGA segments, as explanatory variables. We found that the 
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Figure 1:  Segment Length and Traffic Density, by Segment Category (November 2004 
Data) 
We next investigated average aircraft size for large jet services, again comparing LGA and 
other domestic US flight segments. Figure 2 plots the data for November 2004. The x-axis is the 
product of segment distance and segment traffic density, which has been found in previous 
studies to be a good predictor of average aircraft size. While there is considerable scatter, it is 
clear that for higher passenger-mile (pax-mile) segments average aircraft size is smaller for LGA 
(the blue diamonds) then for other airports (the pink squares). We estimated a log-linear model 
relating average aircraft size to traffic density, segment distance, segment concentration (we used 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to estimate the degree of market concentration on a 
segment), and a complete set of LGA terms including a dummy and interactions between the 
dummy and the other explanatory variables. The results confirm that average aircraft size for 
LGA segments tends to be smaller. For the “average” segment at LGA in terms of density, length, 

























Figure 2:  Average Seats per Flight vs Segment Passenger-Miles, by Segment Category 
(November 2004 Data) 
In sum, while it would be economically efficient to adapt to scarce airfield capacity at 
LGA by up-gauging, our evidence suggests that the actual response has been down-gauging. This 
suggests that slot allocation policies have, at best, failed to encourage efficient behavior. More 
likely, they have had the opposite effect, as a result of the slots that are set aside from smaller 
aircraft under Air-21, as well as the use-it-or-lose it rule that encourages an airline to “baby-sit” 
its slots in order to retain ownership. 
4.2 Comparing Actual LGA Service Levels with System-Efficient Service Levels  
 
It may be that the current LGA schedules and practices produce efficient transportation.  
To address this question one must decide how to measure efficiency.  The airlines need a critical 
mass of passengers on any given flight to cover the flight’s operating costs.  A typical rule of 
thumb is 0.70 Load factor (defined as the fraction of seats filled with paying passengers).  The 
airport authority may want the maximum number of markets (cities) served with the maximum 
number of passengers traveling to or from the city for each aircraft operation.  This measure is 
frequently measured as the airport’s MAP (Million Annual Passengers).  The FAA is concerned 
with keeping aircraft safely separated and separation restrictions lead to a maximum number of 
aircraft operations before congestion begins to lead to substantial delays.  As in freeway traffic, 
there is a strongly non-linear increase in delay as demand approaches capacity.  At LGA, a 16% 
increase in capacity, from 64 operations/hour to 74 operations/hour, results in over a 300% 
increase in delay [Le, 2006].  Frequently, different efficiency metrics are in competition with each 
other. Figure 3 and 4 show how LGA is performing in this light.   
Figure 3 shows that the number of operations was almost constant from 2000 to 2002 but 
experienced a step jump in 2003.  There was initially a decrease in the number of passengers 
carried (presumably due to both a recession and to the 9/11 terrorist incident) but a steady 
increase from 2002 to 2005.  The average number of passengers per aircraft declined from 2000 
to 2002 and sharply decreased in 2003 leading to an increase in the number of operations leading 
to significant delays shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3:  BTS data showing the decrease in average aircraft size with increasing passengers 
and operations [Le, 2006] 
 
Figure 4:  Arrival and Departure Delay from 2000 to 2006 [Le, 2006] 
 
This data is suggestive of inefficient airport passenger movement and air traffic control 
inefficiency but was perhaps efficient for the airline operators.  Figure 5 shows 6 months of flight 
load factor data versus aircraft size data for LGA in 2005.  The horizontal and vertical lines are 
drawn at the 50% point on both aircraft seat size and average load factor.  The data is taken from 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics.  The upper right quadrant represents flights that deliver a 
large number of passengers per operation at high (profitable) load factors.  This is certainly 
efficient from both an airport and an airline perspective.  The lower left quadrant represents 25% 
of all the flights in this six-month period that delivered a small number of passengers-per-flight in 
aircraft that were probably not generating a profit for the airline.  Ironically, the elimination of 
this 25% of inefficient flights would nearly eliminate all of the flight delays at LGA.  We 
certainly would not advocate elimination of all of these flights as some are required to preserve 
minimal service levels to small communities.  However, many have voiced concerns that the 
existence of such flights (at least in certain cases) indicates misuse of scarce LGA resources, e.g. 
see [Kahan, 2005].    
 
Figure 5:  25% of LGA operations are with small aircraft operating at low to negative profit 
margins [Le, 2006] 
 
Is there a schedule that will satisfy all 3 definitions of efficiency: Airport Throughput, 
Airline Profitability and Minimal Flight Delay?.  The question was addressed in [Le, 2006], 
where a multi-commodity flow model was used to generate an entire LGA service profile.  Using 
real market price elasticity data for 67 daily scheduled LGA markets, Le found that 64 markets4 
could be served at 25% fewer flights that provided the airlines 90% of the optimal profit with 
virtually no increase in the average fare price.  This schedule could be accommodated at 64 
operations/hour (the FAA stated all-weather operational rate); with this flight pattern,  computer 
delay models predict that flight delays would decrease by 75% with a corresponding increase 
form 95 to 121 (+27%  increase) in average seats per aircraft.  
4.3 Impact of Congestion Pricing on Average Gauge 
 
The first strategic simulation was based on a plausible hypothesis regarding the level of 
scheduled operations at LGA for November of 2007 assuming the HDR expired and no regulation 
replaced it.  The participants were encouraged to refrain from criticizing specific details of the 
future projection but to understand that this background was designed to provide the players with 
a “realistic problem” that would be representative of a future without any policy modifications.  
The participants were taken through a series of stressful decisions (without knowing how their 
competitors were dealing with the problems) under different hypothetical policy environments.  
The research goal was to better understand the pros and cons of different policy actions, up to and 
including conducting arrival and/or departure time slot auctions by the DOT and FAA (a mock 
auction was not conducted but proposed auction rules were distributed in the form of a Notice for 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)).   
The simulation proceeded through three sequences consisting of a total of five moves.  
Each sequence began with a baseline schedule of operations at LGA.  That schedule was based on 
the August 2004 OAG, with flights added to bring the level of scheduled operations to a 
hypothetical 1400 operations per day, similar to the peak levels seen as a result of AIR-21.  Each 
airline team was responsible for their portion of the schedule. The first sequence began with a 
press release announcing the passage of a Federal “Passenger Bill of Rights” law (PBR) that 
attempted to force airlines to compensate passengers for their delays.   Per-passenger 
compensation was set at $10 per hour of delay and a flight cancellation was assumed to result, on 
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average, in 7 hours of delay.  The first sequence continued by allowing the airline players to make 
schedule changes in response to the PBR. 
The second sequence began again with the baseline, but then proceeded by instructing the 
government team to use whatever administrative procedures they felt were appropriate to handle 
the congestion resulting from the lifting of the HDR.  The game included two rounds of applying 
alternative administrative actions with the airlines adjusting their schedules. The final sequence 
again started with the baseline, and implemented congestion pricing at LGA in an effort to reduce 
the costs to passengers.  Two rounds of adjusting congestion prices were executed. 
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Figure 6:  Aircraft Gauge Results 1st Strategic Simulation 
While there are many interesting aspects to the differences in the airline scheduling 
behavior under the various scenarios, we would like to point out here the variation in average 
aircraft gauge (seats per flight).  As Figure 6 illustrates, under the congestion pricing regimes, the 
airlines manipulated schedules in a way that led to a larger average gauge when compared to the 
airline response under the administrative measures.  We note that under congestion pricing slots 
were eliminated so that there was no incentive to hoard slots or use them inefficiently (to satisfy 
the use-it-or-lose-it rule).  As a result some of the carriers with historically large numbers of slots 
and operations reduced their operations.  At the same time carriers with historically smaller 
footprints at LGA increased their levels of operations.  The increase in average gauge provides 
some evidence that these changes led to a more efficient use of the slot resources.   
More generally this result supports economic arguments that market-based allocation 
mechanisms, e.g. congestion pricing or slot auctions, should lead to better use of the scarce 
airport resources than the present administrative measures.   
5.  CONGESTION PRICING VS AUCTIONS 
Because many otherwise chronically congested airports throughout the world are slot 
controlled, much of the attention in the economics literature has focused on auctions as a 
preferred mechanism to allocate scarce airport capacity. But, there is a potentially useful role for 
congestion pricing if it is implemented before the onset of congestion becomes acute.  
Some of the advantages of congestion pricing are: 
No Slots: With pricing, there is no need to administratively set the number of operations in a 
particular time period.  Instead, prices would be continuously adjusted to reach desired levels of 
activity at the airport, with the target levels set by the FAA. The airport would be like any other 
except landing fees would be higher. 
Carrier Scheduling Flexibility:  In the absence of slots, carriers would be free to try to reduce 
frequencies or up-gauge in reaction to higher congestion fees knowing that they could go back 
later (without the need to buy a slot) and add service or reduce gauge should market conditions so 
dictate.  
Potentially Reduced Strategic Behavior:  Carriers would have no incentive or ability to hoard 
slots in order to prevent their competitors from having adequate access to LaGuardia.  All carriers 
would be free to schedule flights whenever they deemed it appropriate. 
There are potential disadvantages as well.  These include political feasibility, the 
likelihood of pricing inefficiencies, strategic carrier behavior, potential scheduling instability and 
lack of practical experience in implementing congestion pricing. The first strategic simulation 
required the establishment of a politically independent Congestion Pricing Board with an analysis 
staff to set the congestion prices.  In order to prevent severe schedule instabilities, these prices 
may have to be set based upon proposed schedules and computed delays. 
 To address these problems and avoid a potentially unstable environment, the following 
discussion describes congestion pricing for airports just beginning to experience delay. There are 
at least two keys to phasing in congestion-pricing: (1) encouraging congested airports to charge a 
single fee to all aircraft regardless of weight, and (2) establishing an independent Pricing Board 
tasked with dynamically re-setting prices to reach FAA operational targets in cases where delays 
continue to propagate. 
Trigger for action:  FAA would define a trigger when an airport is reaching unacceptable 
congestion.   
Rationale:  FAA would retain control over the integrity of the national system. In all cases, FAA 
would retain the right to set operations levels in the event that other actions did not reduce 
delay exposure to acceptable levels. 
Adjustment to landing fees:  To reduce the growth in delays, when an airport meets the above 
criteria for certain times of the day or days of the week, FAA would encourage the airport 
proprietor (via proprietor assurances or the competition plan process) to change its landing fee 
calculation methodology so that all operations pay the identical fee during each congested time 
period and adjacent time periods (as determined by FAA) and the total funds collected remains 
the same (revenue neutral flat fees). 
Rationale:  Traditional weight based fees provide the wrong incentives in cases where one flight 
precludes another.  The higher fees on heavier aircraft provide incentives for operators to 
fly lighter aircraft.  A flat fee is neutral as to weight or size of aircraft.   
Independent pricing board:  An independent pricing board would be established to set 
congestion surcharges at airports found by the FAA to be experiencing unacceptable delays. 
Rationale:  The Board would have only one objective, to set prices that clear the market for 
airport access.  While it would be free to consider the views of all parties (FAA, the 
airport and operators), it would be judged solely on whether the prices it sets reach the 
operational targets set by FAA. 
Surcharges:  The Pricing Board would set surcharges above flat revenue neutral landing fees at 
airports where the actions taken in (2) proved insufficient, as determined by the FAA.  The Board 
would be empowered to set surcharges at whatever level is necessary to reduce delays to 
acceptable levels. 
Rationale:  The Board will require the power to change prices at any time to prevent carriers 
from feigning entry or additional operations in the hopes of driving competitors from the 
market.  The Board would also require carriers to publish schedules at least 90 days in 
advance of operation to judge potential delays; carriers would be free to adjust schedules 
in reaction to changes in prices up until some point after which schedules would be frozen. 
There would be limits on unscheduled operations during congested periods; unscheduled 
operators would pay the same surcharge as scheduled operators 
Switch to Slots / Auction: In cases where congestion pricing did not result in an orderly market, 
the FAA could implement a slot program, where access would be auctioned. 
Rationale:  In cases where the market was not stable, the FAA would retain the right to 
implement a slot program to control delays; the threat of slots might be sufficient to 
reduce strategic behavior by incumbent operators at the airport. 
 This proposal makes congestion pricing an interim step between normal market access and the 
implementation of slots and auctions. In at least some cases, implementing revenue-neutral flat 
fees or minimal surcharges may be enough to address chronic congestion for some time, thereby 
leaving operators greater freedom to change schedules than would be case once slots are put into 
place. This interim congestion pricing proposal may be particularly attractive in cases where an 
airport has a capacity expansion program underway and needs a relatively short period of time 
during which some capacity management is required to keep delays from exploding.5
The first NEXTOR strategic simulation held in November of 2004 provided some insight 
into the issues identified above.  The simulation provided mixed results regarding the likely level 
of fees that may be needed to reach reasonable operational targets at the airport.   The congestion-
pricing scenario assumed that slots at LGA were eliminated and that the FAA was faced with a 
very large increase in operations.  Table 1 provides the base case schedule (in terms of number of 
operations per time window) that the carriers proposed to operate after elimination of the regional 
jet/small community restrictions attributable to the Air 21 legislation.  Two rounds of congestion 
pricing were executed.  As Table 1 illustrates, operations did decline and there was some 
spreading of operations from one time period.  This operations spreading did in turn create new 
peaks where none had existed before (e.g. 15:30). 
                                                 
5 There may be important barriers to implementing congestion pricing with surcharges in the United States. 
The DOT and FAA “Policy Regarding Airport Rates and Charges” (Federal Register, June 21, 1996, page 
31994) says in part: “The Department’s policy regarding peak pricing was established in its decision in the 
Massport PACE fee case. In that decision, the Department concluded that a properly structured peak pricing 
system could be reasonable and not unjustly discriminatory.  These provisions do not exempt airport 
proprietors from the requirement that total airfield revenues not exceed total airfield costs.” It appears that 









0430 $275 1 $275 1
0530 27 $275 42 $275 42
0630 75 $600 67 $600 67
0730 93 $800 66 $800 76
0830 94 $800 87 $1,000 73
0930 90 $800 71 $1,000 67
1030 84 $600 97 $1,000 96
1130 84 $600 92 $1,000 71
1230 97 $800 61 $800 81
1330 86 $800 63 $800 80
1430 84 $600 85 $1,000 71
1530 83 $600 101 $1,000 101
1630 85 $800 62 $1,200 54
1730 89 $800 86 $1,200 82
1830 92 $800 94 $1,200 81
1930 91 $800 73 $800 85
2030 81 $600 80 $600 79
2130 58 $600 36 $600 39
2230 25 $275 38 $275 38
2330 10 $275 8 $275 8
All Other 0 $275 0 $275 0
Total Operations 1,428 1,310 1,292
Fees are in-lieu of existing departure fees
 
Table 1:  Results of Congestion Pricing Experiment 
Obviously, the simulation pertains to a situation where an airport transitions from slots to 
congestion pricing. This is a far more difficult mission than would be faced by an airport just 
beginning to have a delay problem. Nevertheless, the simulation indicates that congestion pricing 
is effective in reducing overall activity, even at airports with substantial pent up demand 
6.  SLOT AUCTION DESIGN 
In principle, both congestion pricing and auctions should reach the same market-clearing 
price.  In the case of congestion pricing, the government sets the price and the airlines set the 
level of travel predictability and delay.  In the case of auctions, the government sets the capacity 
level and the airlines set the price.  The use of auctions for the allocation of slots at congested 
airports is likely to provide a system that is efficient, i.e. produces an allocation that maximizes 
the benefits to the consumer and the economy by allocating them to those that can generate the 
greatest benefit from the use.  Having a fixed lease period allows the owner of the slot to make 
long-term plans, and allows airlines to adjust schedules with predictable costs for that schedule. 
The knowledge that the slots will be re-auctioned in the future assures that the industry must 
actively re-evaluate the market and the value of ownership of such slots. 
One argument against auctions is that they are another tax on the industry. Auctions do 
raise revenue, but the revenues raised are no more than a reflection of the market value associated 
with a scarce resource.  How the revenue generated is used warrants discussion.  It is our belief 
that the revenue can be used to help pay for the infrastructure necessary to safely administer and 
expand airspace use.  Since such costs must be incurred somehow, one can argue that the 
revenues generated are in lieu of other taxes that would be required if they were not generated 
from the auctioning of slots.  However, we note that careful auction design often works not to 
maximize the revenue from high value bidders, but rather chooses objectives that encourage new 
entries and discourages or disallows monopolistic control over markets.  Thus, the revenue 
generated is a consequence of ensuring efficient outcomes but need not generate any more than 
the minimum necessary to do so. Unlike a tax, which typically distorts behavior in undesirable 
ways, the auction prices are influencing behavior in desirable ways. 
The two principal uses for auctions for LGA congestion management are for the allocation 
of slots by the government to air carriers and for the exchange of slots between air carriers.   We 
call the process by which the government provides slots for a specified period of time to air 
carriers (and possibly others) as the primary slot market.  We call the process by which an air 
carrier sells its slot rights to another carrier as the secondary slot market.  The bulk of this report 
describes an auction design specifically geared toward the primary market.  However, we intend a 
similar procedure to be used in the secondary market as well.   
6. 1  A Primary Market for Slots Having Finite Lease Lives  
There are a number of design issues that must be considered for an auction that allocates 
slot at airports.  We first summarize our assumptions about property rights and then describe an 
auction design we believe is well-suited for the leasing of airport slots.  (For a more complete 
discussion of slot property rights, see [Ball, et al. 2006], [DotEcon, Ltd. 2001].)  We consider an 
auction that confers the exclusive use of the slot during a given time window (e.g. within a fifteen 
minute period) every day.  For each 15-minute period, we assume that the FAA has established 
the number of slots that will be available for auction based on runway and landside capacities.  
The leaseholder of that slot is given the right to trade or sell this slot for any portion of the leasing 
period in a secondary market.  The leaseholder also receives the corresponding rights to terminal 
space, e.g. ticketing, baggage and gating facilities and will pay the “going rate” for these facilities 
based on the current long-term contracts with the local airport authority.  We assume that an 
auction mechanism similar to the primary mechanism is available to allow leaseholders to sell 
their leases periodically. We will say more about the secondary market below.  
6.2  Overview of the Package Bidding Auction Design 
This section describes an auction design that allows the transfer of slots through a 
transparent bidding mechanism whereby slots are put up for a given lease period, the auctioneer 
provides prices for each item and the bidders respond by bidding the number of slots within each 
time period that they wish to procure at that price.  The auction ends when the market clears, i.e. 
when there is no excess demand for the slots.   
The auction design we propose is an ascending clock auction with package bidding, in 
which a bidder submits bids for any package of the slots. A slot is defined to be an arrival or a 
departure during a given time period.  This auction design is capable of handling many related 
items.  The approach combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the clock auction (an 
ascending auction where multiple items are sold simultaneously) with the efficiency of a sealed-
bid package-bidding final round.  The auction design proposed is based on the “Clock-Proxy 
Auction” [Ausubel et al, 2006]. It blends the simplicity of a clock auction with a final proxy 
round based on ideas from [Parkes and Ungar, 2000] and [Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002]. 
The clock auction is a simple iterative auction procedure where the bidders specify the 
number of slots they desire in each time period at the prices announced by the auctioneer. The 
design allows bidders to specify a collection of slots (i.e. a business plan) and know that they will 
win the entire package or none of that package.  Enabling bids on packages of slots protects a 
bidder against the risk of winning only a portion of the slots needed for its business plan. The 
prices provided in each round allow bidders to understand the cost of competition and limit their 
evaluation to packages that they consider most profitable and/or essential to their business.  
This auction design generalizes the eBay-style online auction to accommodate multiple 
items, and it utilizes an “activity rule” that prevents last minute “bid sniping.”6 The auction 
proceeds in rounds. No item is “won” until the end of the auction. Since more than one slot will 
be auctioned in a given time period, a bidder specifies the number of slots desired in each time 
period at the specified price.  
                                                 
6 Bid sniping occurs at the last minute of an auction with a fixed-time ending.  The purpose of sniping is to give other 
bidders no chance to respond to an offer to buy.  Similar actions occur when a bidder prefers to not disclose the value 
that it places on a bid.  This bidder acquires price information from other bidders but does not reciprocate since 
throughout most of the auction, the bidder is silent.  Such bidders are often referred to as "snakes in the grass" since 
they do not participate throughout the auction, but "snipe" or "attack" at the end of the auction.    
 
 This auction design includes a feature known as intra-round bidding – the ability for 
bidders to provide information about slot demand between the last round and current round bid 
prices –to accelerate the auction process.  This feature allows the auctioneer to specify larger 
price increments between rounds without jumping past the maximum price that bidders are 
willing to pay for slots.  Thus, a bidder who wanted a given package at the last round prices but 
finds that the package is no longer profitable/desirable at the current prices has the opportunity to 
specify a price point in between the last round and the current round prices for which this package 
would remain of interest.  This bid would indicate that the bidder is willing to purchase this 
package at any price up to the intra-round bid price.  A bidder can supply up to a fixed number 
(specified by the auctioneer prior to the start of the auction) of intra-round package bids in each 
round, thereby providing the price points at which a bidder wishes to substitute one package for 
another package. 
The concept behind intra-round bidding is to allow a larger price increment between 
rounds without jumping past the maximum price that bidders will pay for slots. The auctioneer 
announces start-of-round and end-of-round prices and the bidders can provide “price points”, 
implying linear combinations between the beginning and ending prices, and specify a preferred 
package at the implied prices.  For instance, assume that the beginning price for a given time 
period is $10 and the ending price is $20.  Between $10 and $13.99, the bidder wants 4 slots. 
Between $14.00 and $16.50, it wants 3.  And any price between $16.51 and $20.00, it will accept 
2 slots.  This bidder would then provide three bids:  one at the beginning price, one at $14.00 and 
one at $16.51.   If there is more demand for this item than supply at the $20.00 price, then the 
starting price in the next round is $20.00 and the ending price is somewhere above $20.00, 
determined by the auctioneer.  If, on the other hand, not all items sell at $20.00, then the 
auctioneer determines at what price all items clear and announces that price as the starting price 
of the next round.  Intra-round bidding and other practical aspects of implementing clock auctions 
are described in greater detail in [Ausubel and Cramton, 2004]. 
 At the end of each round of the auction, new bid prices for the next round are computed. 
The prices will increase on arrival and departure slots where aggregate demand exceeds the 
supply, and the bidders will again be given the opportunity to specify desired slot quantities at the 
new prices. Prices increase as a function of the amount of excess demand for the individual slots. 
The price of a package is then determined by summing the unit prices for each of the slots that 
make up that package. The auctioneer announces the total number of bids (aggregate demand) for 
all slots within each time period and the new prices of the slots. This process is repeated until 
either the auction closes naturally when there is no excess demand for slots in any time period or 
can be stopped by the auctioneer when total auction revenue increases by less than a target figure 
in two successive rounds, at which point a “last and best round” is declared.  If the auctioneer 
declares a last and best round, these bids must comply with the activity rule but unlike bids 
earlier in the auction, the bidders can provide final bid prices that exceed current end prices. The 
auction will close with the final allocation that maximizes revenue given these final bids and all 
bids in previous rounds.   However, rather than forcing bidders to pay the price bid, a procedure is 
employed (called a “proxy auction mechanism”) that assures that the winning bidders pay only 
the minimum required to overcome the non-winning coalitions of bidders. Thus, as with a proxy 
bid in an eBay auction, the winning bidder pays the lowest price that prevents another bidder 
from winning, rather than paying its maximum bid amount. As a result, the identity of the 
winning bidders remains the same; only the prices that they pay are affected. For a complete 
description of the underlying economic properties of the proxy auction, see [Ausubel and 
Milgrom, 2002].  
` At the end of the auction, winners will be announced.   All winners will be required to 
provide payment of the total bid price within 30 days of the end of the auction.  A bidder who 
defaults on payment will be assessed a default penalty equal to a given percentage of the bid price 
or the difference between the bid price and the bid of the highest losing bid on that slot, 
whichever is higher.   
A well-functioning and transparent slot auction needs rules that make the early bidding in 
the auction meaningful and that discourage last-minute bidding. In familiar on-line auctions such 
as eBay, a bidder has an incentive to place bids in the final seconds of the auction, to conceal the 
bidder’s intentions (sniping).  In order to avoid this problem, the clock auction phase utilizes an 
activity rule that requires bidders to bid for minimum quantities of slots at the beginning of the 
auction in order to continue to be eligible to bid for equivalent quantities at the end of the auction.  
A bidder’s initial activity is based on an advance deposit intended to assure that bidders complete 
the purchase of slots they win in the auction.  Such upfront deposits are typically 5-10% of the 
final prices anticipated in the auction.   To maintain this activity, the bidder must continue to bid 
for a reasonable quantity of items for which they provided upfront payments.  When they fail to 
do so, their future activity will be limited by these actions.  Thus, the activity rule is designed to 
make the bidding in early rounds meaningful and to provide bidders with incentive to represent 
truthfully their demands.  This is important for a well-functioning auction, because useful price-
discovery requires sincere and early bidding by all parties. This auction design has a number of 
positive features. The present auction design is related to simultaneous multiple round auctions 
used by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for spectrum licenses. Although these 
auctions have been quite successful and have been adapted to many other applications, the present 
auction design makes a number of improvements over the previous designs:  
1. Enabling bids on packages of slots protects bidders against the risk of winning only a 
portion of the slots needed for its business. 
2. The auction groups functionally equivalent slots into fungible classes, thereby 
expediting the auction – in this case, all arrival slots in a given time period are 
considered fungible; 
3. The auction design limits the amount of non-essential information provided to the 
bidders, thereby reducing potential problems of collusion and retaliatory bidding. Price 
and demand information are provided to the bidders after each round, but information 
about the specific behavior of particular bidders is not provided;  
4. Bidders have the ability to specify packages at prices in-between the last round and the 
current round informing the auctioneer that they are willing to pay up to some price 
that is less than the price announced by the auctioneer.  
5. There is an activity rule called the revealed-preference rule that forces bidders to bid in 
a manner consistent with profit maximization.  
6. Bidders will be responsible for paying for these slots at the conclusion of the auction 
and, if a bidder defaults, there will be a penalty assessed for such actions.  Thus, 
bidders must be sincere in their offers throughout the auction process. 
For the strategic simulation held in February 2005, we needed to provide an example of 
how the general design might work.  We instructed the participants of this game to consider these 
specifics as illustrative and set by the researchers rather than by the FAA.  For the game, we set 
the total number of arrival/departure slots per fifteen minute period to be equal to 8. (Consistent 
with FAA policy, we left one slot per fifteen minute period available to general aviation.)  We 
assumed that slots would have a lifetime of 5 years and that the initial lease lengths would be 
staggered so that each year approximately 20% of the slot leases would expire.  The initial 
allocation of slots was based on current incumbency rights, and, in order to initiate the process, 
the remaining lifetimes on slots were staggered. An additional transition increment was added to 
each lease lifetime.  We assumed a transition increment of 2 years for the game.  Thus, 
approximately 20% of the initial slot allotments had a lifetime of 7 (2+5) years, 20% had a 
lifetime of 8 (3+5) years, etc.  In the initial allocation, the lifetimes of the slots allocated to each 
carrier were uniformly distributed among all of the slots owned by that carrier. The players 
understood that there would be a transparent secondary market for slot sales, held quarterly.  All 
sales of slots by leaseholders were to be made on this secondary market.  They were to consider 
the secondary market to be identical to the primary market from the buyer’s perspective (i.e. there 
would be no difference in lease rights whether the prior owner was the FAA or an airline).  For 
the initial 1, 2, or 3 years, there would only be a secondary market.     
The strategic simulation took place over two days.  In order to simplify the bidding, we 
defined a slot to be both a landing right and a take-off right at LGA, bundled together. The time 
specified was an explicit landing time together with an implied take-off time, i.e. the purchase of 
the slot allows the airline also to schedule a departure at any time within 1.5 hours after the 
arrival. The clock-proxy auction design accommodates the separation of arrival slots from 
departure slots, in the event that the industry finds this separation more desirable.  Airline 
executives, representatives of the PANYNJ, FAA employees, and researchers participated in the 
mock-auction.   We believe that the participants found the exercise useful.  The discussions that 
followed the game were extraordinarily fruitful in moving our research forward.  For example, the 
PANYNJ was concerned that up-gauging of aircraft might create ground capacity problems. 
[Wang and Klein, 2006] performed detailed simulations of the ground operations and found that 
the airport could accommodate the larger planes.  Similarly, the simple approach used for 
allocating slots (using draws from a uniform distribution) created allocations where larger airlines 
were provided with slots that were bunched either toward early or toward late expiration dates.  
[Ball and Zhong, 2006] devised a new algorithm that eliminated this problem. Finally, the 
industry asked whether there were decision support tools that could help them in determining 
their bids.  [Harsha et al., 2005] have been developing such tools.  
Thus, the strategic simulation demonstrated the feasibility of an auction approach, 
educated various members of the aviation community about auction use, helped the researchers 
better understand features of the design, and helped direct future research of the NEXTOR team.     
6.3  Relationship of Primary Market to Secondary Market 
We now describe how the secondary and primary markets interact. We are proposing a 
transparent secondary market, one all carriers must use to buy or sell slots. There will be no 
other mechanism for the sale of such slots.  Thus, sales of slot lease authorizations will be 
permitted only through the blind market overseen by the FAA.  The restriction of sales to the slot 
auction will ensure that all carriers have an equal opportunity to purchase slots. No subleasing 
will be allowed.  However, carriers are permitted one-for-one exchanges of slots so long as no 
additional consideration is provided.  These exchanges must be publicly disclosed and can take 
place outside of the blind market because many of these arrangements are for operational reasons 
and can be accomplished only through multi-carrier trades.  Such exchanges would be an 
effective way to deal with variations in seasonal demand.  However, such slot exchanges must 
have received written approval of by the FAA.   
A secondary auction will take place every three months.   The slots available during any 
auction will be those that have been placed into the auction by current leaseholders and by the 
FAA.   If the slots are submitted by a leaseholder, then the FAA will augment the lease period so 
that the buyer will have use of the slot for the standard period.    Thus, the secondary auction and 
the primary auction (new slots offered by the FAA or slots that have reverted to the FAA) will be 
intermingled with the slots offered by sellers.  During the first few years, most slots submitted for 
auction are expected to be those offered by sellers.      
 Carriers having arrival or departure rights at LaGuardia may place such rights up for sale 
in the quarterly auction.   Those purchasing these lease rights will be under the same rules and 
fees as those imposed upon the seller.  When a carrier puts a lease up for sale, the carrier agrees to 
work closely with the PANYNJ to provide access to gates and other ground facilities.  A buyer of 
slots must put up an advance deposit to ensure that such bidders are capable of paying for the 
slots won.  Such upfront deposits are typically 5-10% of the largest price bid on any package 
within the auction. 
The FAA will collect such offers to sell and alter the lease life of such offers so that each 
lease up for sale will have a ten-year life.  The seller and the FAA will share the amount received 
from the sale of the slot proportional to the time each had ownership of that lease.  The only 
consideration permitted for transactions in the auction is cash.  Use of real property such as gates, 
non-monetary assets or other services in lieu of cash is not permitted.   
Any carrier may participate in the secondary market as a buyer.  However, a seller selling 
an arrival lease (departure lease) at a given period cannot buy an equivalent arrival (departure) 
lease in the same period.  The seller has the right to specify a reserve price and the lease will not 
be sold unless a buyer is willing to procure the lease at a price equal to or greater than the reserve 
price.   
 If a seller finds that there are no buyers for a slot he wishes to sell, then the buyer can – at 
any time – relinquish ownership of the slot and the slot will revert to the FAA. 
The auction design and rules for the secondary slots are the same as those for the primary 
auction.  We are proposing that the FAA use a clock-proxy mechanism. 
6.4  Advantages and Disadvantages to the Use of Primary and Secondary Markets for Slot 
Allocation 
The advantages of auctions to control congestion include: (1) Congestion is controlled 
because the slot allocation was set to insure appropriate use of runways and ground facilities; (2) 
The initial allocation is based on incumbency and provides a transition period for the airlines to 
adjust to this new allocation mechanism; (3) Limited slot lifetimes and use of market mechanism 
for allocation insures slot turnover and efficient use of slots. (4) A transparent market mechanism 
provides the industry with information about the market value of slots and encourages the 
highest-valued uses of such slots; (5) The sale of leases exclusively through a transparent market 
places all airlines on an equal footing when attempting to procure rights at a congested airport; (7) 
The auction provides a new non-distortionary source of revenue that can be used to reduce 
distortionary taxes and fees; (8) This new source of funds can be directed toward capacity 
expansion; (9) Auctions have proven very successful in other government settings where they 
have been used to auction spectrum rights, environmental credits, power generation and 
distribution, and Treasury bills; and (10) Web-based tools for conducting auctions are now well-
developed. 
The disadvantages of an auction mechanism for slot allocation are that:  (1) The transition 
period may lengthen the time before real changes are seen; (2) Auctions may place a new 
financial burden on airlines, but can be mitigated to the extent that these revenues offset existing 
taxes and fees; (3) The use of slots may limit an airline’s flexibility in creating schedules that 
respond to current demand changes; (4) Auctions require that the FAA carefully specify 
capacities, define the rights associated with these slot leases, and determine an appropriate 
lifetime for slots that is neither so long that it hampers the ability of the industry to respond to 
market changes nor so short that their airlines find it difficult to plan appropriately and (5) There 
is no authorization currently for the FAA to use either congestion pricing or auctions for the 
allocation of slots although the FAA is currently requesting such authorization.  
7.   COORDINATING SLOT ACCESS WITH ACCESS TO OTHER AIRPORT 
RESOURCES 
When one considers the possibility of a reallocation of slots among carriers at LGA, 
substantial issues arise with respect to the ability of LGA to handle the related changes in the 
characteristics of overall LGA operations.  For example, it is likely that the aircraft fleet mix will 
change, the number of passengers passing through the terminal per day, the number of bags 
processed per day, etc.  A second, even more problematic area is the need of carriers with new or 
increased slot holding to gain access to “other” airport resources, including gates, ticket counters, 
baggage handling facilities, etc.  Probably the most substantial of these issues is access to gates.   
Property ownership at LGA is a complex issue.  The airport property itself is owned by 
the City of New York, and is leased to the PANYNJ for the purposes of operating the airport.  
Many of the gate and terminal facilities were built with airline funds under an agreement with 
PANYNJ.  For example, US Airways built its own terminal building that is considerably more 
modern than the main (shared) terminal used by other carriers.  This, building certainly would be 
considered an important (competitive) asset of US Airways.  In such cases, the airline-investor 
typically obtained a long-term lease for the facilities.   PANYNJ typically has 30-day revocation 
clauses; however, in the event of such a revocation PANYNJ would have to compensate the 
appropriate airline for the un-recovered investment in the appropriate facility.  For this and other 
reasons, PANYNJ is reluctant to revoke leases.  Thus, airlines can exercise strong control over 
such facilities making it difficult for airlines wishing to expand operations, e.g. based on new slot 
holdings.  A further complication is that airlines naturally would want to have their gate facilities 
in reasonably contiguous locations.  Gate facilities in different concourses would generally be 
undesirable, particularly for airlines with modest numbers of operations.   
Historically, when new entrants have come in, or existing carriers have expanded 
operations, PANYNJ and the appropriate carriers have worked together to identify gate facilities 
usually through a variety of negotiations with existing gate lease holders.  Of course, carriers have 
made deals directly with one another, e.g. to buy or sell leases and also through sub-leasing.  It is 
certainly the case that rapid large-scale changes in access to gate facilities would be challenging, 
if not impossible.  On the other more gradual changes probably can be accomplished.  
Nonetheless, this area remains a critical potential impediment to a carrier wishing to expand 
operations at LGA.  Thus, if slot access becomes more open so that significant changes are 
anticipated over time, then significant steps should be taken to insure reasonable flexibility with 
respect to gate access.  These steps might include the creation of more common-use gates and/or 
the creation of incentives that improve the ability of the PANYNJ to reallocate gate access. 
8.  THE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AND CURRENT STATUS 
In August of 2006, the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) [Federal 
Aviation Administration 2006] that addressed congestion management at LGA after the 
expiration of the HDR.  The NPRM specified that the existing slots would be replaced with 
operating authorizations (OA’s).  Each OA would have an expiration date defined so that the 
lifetimes varied between 3 and 13 years, i.e. after 3 years approximately 10% of the OA’s would 
expire per year.  The OA’s are to be initially allocated in a way that is consistent with existing 
operator slot holdings.  The manner in which expired OA’s would be reallocated is left 
unspecified but the NPRM indicated a desire on the part of the Federal Government to explore the 
use of market mechanisms.  The NPRM also included an incentive structure meant to encourage 
the use of larger aircraft.  Specifically, average aircraft gauge goals would be set; holders of OA’s 
that fell below the gauge goals would be subject to forfeiture of OA rights.  The FAA could then 
either eliminate that OA thereby reducing airport demand (and congestion) or could reallocate the 
OA using a to-be-determined procedure.  The NPRM specified certain possible exemption 
policies that would allow the use of smaller aircraft (that did not meet the gauge goals) for service 
to small communities.  No final rule-making has been issued.  Since the HDR authorization 
expired on January 1, 2007, an interim rule was put in place that largely preserved the HDR status 
quo.  The move toward finite lifetime OA’s as well as the intention expressed to explore market 
mechanisms would seem to indicate a interest on the part of the Federal Government in 
considering types of approaches described in this paper.   
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